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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
in future cases to ignore the "other factors" which the legislature included for
consideration, as well as a tendency to decide the issue of good cause solely upon the
basis of wage reductions.
Our court has said, in speaking about the department of social security, "This
court has expressed the view that courts should let administrative boards and
officers work out their problems with as little judicial interference as possible. One
of the primary reasons for the creation of administrative agencies is to secure the
benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous experience in difficult and
complicated fields. To unduly restrict the operations of administrative bureaus
would defeat the very purpose for which they have been established." Robinson v.
Olsendam, 38 Wn. 2d 30, 37, 227 P. 2d 732, 736 (1951). It must be recognized that
the determination of "good cause" does not peculiarly require the mind of an expert.
Neither does it require a "legal mind" for an accurate decision; yet, if this were a ques-
tion wholly of law special legal training would be necessary. See Brown, supra, at 921.
If this case does decide a pure question of law, the holding must be that a wage
reduction of slightly more than twelve per cent is, as a matter of law, not good
cause for voluntary termination of employment so as to qualify a person for
unemployment benefits. The holding of our court is not in terms of percentage of
income which could have set a general standard and been a guide to a considerable
body of future cases. To hold that a wage reduction of twenty (or perhaps thirty)
cents per hour is not good cause for voluntary termination of employment in a
particular fact situation, is neither decisive nor illuminating. Futhermore, the
decision results in an invitation to a large body of litigation into already crowded
courts. Perhaps a better solution would have been to remand and require the Com-
missioner to list the facts to which he gave weight and to state precisely the
reasons for his decision. Then, in the event of court review, any issues wholly of
law could be clearly segregated by the court. However, the court did hear and
decide this case but gave no reasons for its holding. It appears that the court
decided a question of fact while purporting to decide an issue of law.
THoMAs E. SAL, Ja.
Labor-Picketing-When Enjoinable. At a previous trial P was granted an injunction
against picketing by D union after it was found that a labor dispute existed but that
one of the objectives of the union was unlawful. The decree was affirmed in Ostroff v.
Laundry & Dye Works Local 566, 37 Wn. 2d 595, 225 P. 2d 419 (1950). The basis for
the finding of a labor dispute was in the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between P and one member of D union. The illegal objective was that P sign a con-
tract with D that he employ only union members in his plant, and only members of D
union in the pick-up and delivery of his work. The court said that if the illegal objec-
tive were eliminated the injunction would be dissolved. Subsequently, the union elimi-
nated the illegal objective, but K, the only union employee working for P at the time
the picketing began, discontinued his picketing duties against P over a year before the
present action and has not been actively employed through D union since. Held: K is
still to be regarded as an employee of P for the purposes of the case, and since a labor
dispute therefore still exists, the injunction is dissolved. Ostroff v. Laundry & Dye
Works Local 566, 39 Wn. 2d 693, 237 P. 2d 784 (1951).
In considering where this case fits into the picture of picketing in this state a num-
ber of problems in the field of picketing become evident. Peaceful picketing will not be
enjoined if it is found that a labor dispute exists and the objectives are not unlawful.
Ostroff v. Laundry & Dye Works Local 566, supra (1951) ; Isthmian Steamship Corn-
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patsy v. National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, Brotherhood of Marine
Engineers, 141 Wash. Dec. 95, 247 P. 2d 549 (1952) ; RCW 49.32.010 [RRS § 7612-13].
Conversely, peaceful picketing will be enjoined if a labor dispute does not exist, Morris
v. Local Union 494 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of Spo-
kane, 39 Wn. 2d 33, 234 P. 2d 543 (1951), or if the objectives are unlawful, Ostroff v.
Laundry & Dye Works Local 566, supra (1950).
Objectives that have been held not to be unlawful include demands for higher
wages, Kimbel v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union No. 2575, 189 Wash. 416, 65 P.
2d 1066 (1937) ; demands for agreement of employer as to hours of business, Wright
v. Teamsters' Union Local No. 690, 33 Wn. 2d 905, 207 P. 2d 662 (1949) ; a demand
for a union delegate to appraise conditions and practices of employment to assure a
reasonable standard of pay, Berger v. Sailors Union of the Pacific, 29 Wn. 2d 810, 189
P. 2d 473 (1948) ; a demand for a union security agreement that is not forced on the
employees by the employer, Isthmian Steamship Company v. National Marine Engi-
neers Beneficial Association, supra; cf. Berger v. Sailors Union of the Pacific, supra,
at 813, 189 P. 2d at 475; and demands to abide by provisions of a contract between the
employer and the union for clear and definite wages, Edwards v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 313, 8 Wn. 2d 392, 113 'P. 2d 28 (1941) ; or adherence to provisions of a
contract not to deliver to "unfair" customers, Marvel Baking Co. v. Teamsters' Union
No. 524, 5 Wn. 2d 346, 105 P. 2d 46 (1940).
A labor dispute does not exist when no member of the picketing union is an "em-
ployee" of the picketed employer. When a union worker is originally hired, it usually
is a simple matter to determine whether an employer-employee relationship is created.
However, difficulties do arise in certain circumstances in determining when a person is
an employee.
In the case of the self-employer, the court favors the interests of the self-employer
rather than the interests of the union. Morris v. Local Union 494 of the Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of Spokane, supra. Even though the self-employer
had been a member of the union the day before the picketing egan, the court has found
no basis for a labor dispute. Cline v. Automobile Drivers and Demonstrators Local
Union No. 882,33 Wn. 2d 666, 207 P. 2d 616 (1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 470 '(1950). Thus it
seems that unless there is an existing contract between the union and the self-employer
or unless the self-employer is a union member, the court will enjoin any picketing by
the union. The self-employer can end any union membership at will by terminating his
membership and this will be sufficient for the court to declare the union membership
ended.
In Berger v. Sailors Union of the Pacific, supra, the court held that the relationship
of ordinary employment existed ev'en though the "employees" were limited partners
and shared in the profits according to their terms of membership in the partnership.
Two of the judges felt that the relationship was not distinguishable from that of the
usual employment in that the "employees" exchanged their labor for compensation and
performed their duties under the supervision of a man who possessed and exercised the
power to direct them, as well as to discharge them. Four of the judges thought that the
limited partnership was a mere sham to avoid the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. One judge dissented on the ground that even though the partnership was
organized to avoid the employer-employee relationship, this did not make it a sham.
Another type of arrangement that has failed to prevent the existence of a labor
dispute is a leasing agreement between an owner of a business and the operator of a
part of the business, even though attended by separate bookkeeping and other such
formalities. Wright v. Teamsters' Union Local No. 690, supra. In Fornili v. Auto
Mechanics Local No. 297, 200 Wash. 283, 93 P. 2d 422 (1939), such an arrangement
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was held to be a mere subterfuge to avoid a contract with the union.
It still remains to be decided whether an employee who belongs to one union but is
hired for a job not covered by the union is in a position such that a labor dispute could
exist. For example, if a union truck driver were hired as a clerk in a retail clothing
store which had its own non-union delivery service, could the truck drivers' union
picket the store demanding that the employer sign a contract not to deliver on certain
days or after certain hours?
If it is conceded or established that the worker in question is an employee, and has
appropriate union membership, the question then arises, what acts prior to the contro-
versy may prevent the future existence of a labor dispute? Thus, if the only union
members employed withdraw from employment or are discharged before the contro-
versy in question has arisen, they are considered by the court to be no longer connected
with the establishment for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of a labor dispute.
Morris v. Local Union 494 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of
Spokane, supra; Fornili v. Auto Mechanics' Union Local No. 297, supra.
It is conceivable that the relationship of union employee-employer might be changed,
so that no labor dispute could thereafter exist, by a promotion or other change in status
of the employee. For example, the employer might take the only union-employee into
partnership, might promote him to a manager, or might change his capacity so that
his job is entirely different. This question has not as yet been considered by the court.
The relationship of union employee-employer may cease for the purposes of deter-
mining the existence of a labor dispute if the employee terminates his union member-
ship. When the employee does not take positive acts to disaffiliate but merely discon-
tinues to work through the union or pay dues, the court is reluctant to say that the
employee is no longer a union employee. In Wright v. Teamsters' Union Local No. 690,
supra, the employee, under union by-laws, had been suspended for almost a month for
non-payment of dues when the dispute arose. The court held that the suspension was
not equivalent to loss of union membership, and that a labor dispute therefore existed.
However, in Cline v. Auto Drivers and Demonstrators Local No. 882, supra, a self-
employed proprietor of a car lot paid his initiation fee and one year's dues to a union
association in April, 1946. The court said that he "was not a member of the association,
and had not been since April, 1947."
If affirmative action is taken by the union employee to disaffiliate from the union,
he will most likely be considered by the court to be no longer a union member. Thus
in Hanke v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers Union, Local 309, 33 Wn. 2d 646, 207 P. 2d 206 (1949), aff'd, 339 U. S. 470
(1950), where a union member had notified the union that he had no intention of seek-
ing reinstatement and the union ceased to regard him as a member, the court said that
no member of the union was involved.
Once it is determined that a labor dispute exists, may it be ended by acts of the
employee, the employer, or the union? If, after the dispute has arisen, the employee is
discharged or voluntarily leaves the employment, the court is clear in the second
Ostroff case that the relationship will still exist as a basis of determining a labor dis-
pute. The court stated that to hold that the relationship could be terminated by such
acts would mean "that an employer, by many conceivable acts, such as the prompt dis-
charge of an employee or the prolongation of the dispute until economic necessity
forced the employee to seek work elsewhere, could place himself in the position of
having no union employees; consequently, no labor dispute. This does not appear to us
to be equitable."
Assuming that a promotion or a change in the union employee's status before the
controversy arises could change the relationship enough so that a labor dispute could
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not be found, it hardly seems that this should also be true if the change occurs after a
dispute arises. If such were the case, an employer could terminate the basis of a labor
dispute at his discretion, as the court intimates, without complying with any of the
union's demands.
Although, after the dispute arises, the union employee fails to pay dues or actively
participate through the union, according to the second Ostroff case he will still be con-
sidered a member of the union, so long as he has not attempted to withdraw from the
union. There the union employee had discontinued any active employment through the
union and had taken up employment in another field of work.
One final question is raised by the second Ostroff case with regard to the possible
termination of a labor dispute. 'In that case, since the only union employee h-:A left
P's employment, it seems that if the union had ended its controversy with P, it would
not be able to resume picketing at a later date unless the basis for a labor dispute could
be found, i.e., unless one of its members had been hired by P or unless one of P's
employees had joined the union. The question is then, how far may a union go in chang-
ing or altering its demands before the original controversy will be considered at an
end? In the, first Ostroff case, the court seemed to invite the change in demands and
this was done all to the satisfaction of the court in the second Ostroff case. Assuming
that the changes affected all of the union demands and all new demands were subse-
quently made, would not the time for determining the labor dispute then be at the time
the new demands were made rather than at the time of the original demands? If the
changes made in the demands did not completely replace the old demands, when will the
court consider the time for determining the basis of a labor dispute to have shifted from
the original time to the time the new demands are made?
' As may be seen from the cases here presented, there are a number of questions that
the court, or the legisIature if it chooses, may answer for us at a future date. The rule
that peaceful picketing will not be enjoined if a labor dispute exists and the objectives
are not unlawful seems fairly stable and not likely to be changed except by statute.'
From the list of objectives that have been declared unlawful and the ones that have,
been held lawful, the union and the employer have a fair idea of'how their relations
should be guided. Similarly, there seems to bd a fair criterion for establishing when
a person is an employee. But much speculation begins to arise in the inception and
termination of that status. Also, it is not clear how changes in demands will affect the
existence of a labor dispute if all of the union employees had left their employment
after the dispute arose. Clarification of these matters will probably await case-by-case
determination in the courts, but a replacement or remodeling of the twenty-year-old
labor disputes act, RCW 49.32.010 et seq. [RRS § 7612 et seq.], would be a great con-
tribution to clarification of the labor picture in Washiigton.
ROBERT S. "MJCKLESTONE
Evidence-Admissibility of Related Offenses. D was charged with sodomy and rape.
A confession of a prior similar assault and attempted rape was admitted with the
instruction that the confession should be used only for whatever bearing it might have
upon common scheme or plan in connection with the rape charges. D was acquitted of
rape and convicted of sodomy. Appeal. Held: Affirmed. Evidence of other crimes may
not be admitted unless the evidence is relevant and necessary to prove an essential
ingredient of the crime charged. This confession was not sufficiently related to show
w common scheme 'or plan. However, D was not prejudiced as to the rape charges
because he was acquitted of rape, nor did the evidence prejudice him on the sodomy
counts because the confession could have been properly admitted to establish identity
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